The debates between the structuralists and horizontalists highlighted the fact that endogenous money proponents had a very different understanding of monetary operations than did neoclassical economists. Indeed, as Fullwiler (2003) reports, until recently, research among neoclassicals related to bank behavior in the U. S. federal funds market had little relation to research on the Fed's behavior, and vice versa, aside from a few notable exceptions. This has all changed considerably since the late 1990s, as neoclassical researchers found several issues that required bringing the two together-such as concerns about policy options at the zero bound, retail sweep accounts, payments system crises, and increased use of non-central bank wholesale settlement options. Whereas a detailed understanding of monetary operations has been central to research in the endogenous money tradition for decades now, it is not a stretch to suggest that it is now also a well-established area of research within neoclassical monetary economics.
journal publications, monetary policy implementation remains "a side issue" in neoclassical monetary theory graduate textbooks like Walsh (2003) (Bindseil 2004, 1) . Further, neoclassicals still do not consider money to be endogenously created in the banking system, as Marc Lavoie repeatedly notes; indeed, as Charles Goodhart has argued in a series of recent papers, there is in fact no private banking system whatsoever in the new consensus model (e.g., Goodhart 2008a). This is disappointing, naturally, since the evidence published in the recent neoclassical literature on central bank operations has in fact been remarkably consistent with the endogenous money view of central bank operations. The horizontalist view that central banks only target interest rates directly (not reserve or monetary aggregates) and can do so as precisely as desired has been in particular repeatedly supported by this literature. While the relevant literature could fill several volumes, of special note here is the book by Ulrich Bindseil (2004) , former Head of the ECB's Liquidity Management Section, which describes in substantial detail the operations of the Fed, ECB, and Bank of England in a manner that very nearly resembles the horizontalist story.
The purpose of this chapter is to describe ten general principles of modern central bank operations. These ten principles are not intended to be exhaustive or comprehensive; neither are the discussions of the individual principles necessarily exhaustive. Rather, these principles represent "what every economist should now be expected to know" given the large quantities of orthodox and heterodox research in this area and the empirical or anecdotal evidence contained in speeches and publications of central bank officials. As noted already, this research generally confirms the earlier points made by Moore (1988) and other authors associated in one way or another with the horizontalist literature. As endogenous money proponents have known for some time, loans create deposits as a matter of accounting. Pollin (1991) notes that both horizontalists and structuralists accept Alan Holmes's (1969) argument that "real-world banks extend credit, creating deposits in the process, and then look for the [reserve balances] later." Pollin argued, however, that the two approaches diverged on the issue of "how and where do the banks . . . obtain the additional [reserve balances] once they have 'extended more credit, creating deposits in the process '?" (1991, p. 367) . His question, though, itself begs the more fundamental question-does the fact that a bank has extended credit necessarily mean that it must actively attempt to acquire additional reserve balances? The answer is found by considering the two reasons banks need reserve balances in the first place. Banks hold reserve balances in their central bank accounts to settle payments and to meet reserve requirements.
Pollin's query was made within the context of reserve requirements; his argument implied that the existence of additional credit would raise deposits and thereby raise reserve requirements, which would thereby necessitate that the bank would hold more reserve balances (absent an increase in vault cash). Moore (1991, p. 407 ) appropriately counters Pollin, noting that the creation of a new loan need not lead to greater reservable deposits, but could be met with an increase in liabilities that have lower (or zero) required reserve ratios. Moore noted further that this would be all the more likely where interest rates were higher or where reserve balances were non-earning assets, both of which raise the opportunity cost of holding reserve balances or deposits and encourage banks to immediately seek ways to reduce their reserve requirements. Consistent with Moore's argument, since the emergence of retail sweep accounts in the mid-to-late 1990s, reserve requirements have been largely voluntary in the U. S. as banks use computer software to monitor deposit account activities of customers and "sweep" idle balances into non-reservable money market deposit accounts (Fullwiler 2003; Anderson and Rasche 2001) .
Furthermore, as Moore noted in several papers in the 1980s, the need to meet reserve requirements occurs with a lag in the U. S. (particularly given the return to lagged reserve accounting in 1998) and in other countries. The maintenance period-the period of time during which banks have to meet reserve requirements on average-ends (and, in most cases, begins) after a bank's reserve requirement has been determined. In the U. S, for instance, a given two-week maintenance period starts 17 days after a bank's reserve requirement for the maintenance period has been set. In the European Monetary Union, the maintenance period is lagged and lasts twice as long as in the U. S. In short, the act of extending credit and the act of acquiring reserve balances to meet reserve requirements should be kept quite separate. Furthermore, by necessity, banks short of their reserve requirement (which happens rarely given carry-over provisions that enable banks to meet in the following maintenance period deficiencies incurred in the current maintenance period) will automatically receive an overdraft into their reserve accounts at the central bank's stated penalty rate for such deficiencies; as such, even if maintenance and computation periods were truly contemporaneous (as some economists have proposed), required reserve deficiency would simply mean that a bank would incur an overdraft in its reserve account at the central bank's stated penalty rate. In other words, there is not additional constraint on bank behavior arising from the manipulation of the relative timing of maintenance and computation periods.
Overall, the act of acquiring reserve balances to meet reserve requirements has to do with keeping the bank's cost of funds below the central bank's penalty rate, and has nothing to do with constraints on a bank's ability to create outside money.
Though still important in Japan and Europe, for instance, reserve requirements are now of little significance in the U. S. and are absent in many other countries. In these cases, the role of reserve balances is to settle payments. Here again, the extension of credit, which usually is accompanied by a payment transmitted by the bank on behalf of the new borrower, often does not require the bank to have reserve balances or to otherwise acquire them in money markets. In some nations, for instance, a significant percentage of payments are settled on a netted basis while banks are responsible for settling only a small percentage of these payments via their central bank accounts (Fullwiler 2006, 505-510) . Further, in the U. S., banks sending payments within the minute that they receive another payment of equal or greater value do not incur a debit from their reserve accounts; consequently, banks frequently batch and send most of their payments during high settlement periods (McAndrews and Rajan 2000) . Finally, as explained in Principle 2 below, central banks generally provide overdrafts to banks at some price, enabling banks to send payments even when reserve account balances have zero or negative balances. In short, that a bank extends credit and (in most cases) clears a payment on behalf of the borrower does not necessitate that the bank has or otherwise actively seeks out additional reserve balances; instead, at issue for the bank is the price at which it is able to obtain needed reserve balances from other banks or at a penalty from the central bank in order to effect final settlement of the day's payments.
The point here is to decouple the quantity of reserve balances held by a bank from analysis of a bank's decision or its ability to extend credit, which is not usually understood by neoclassicals or by even some endogenous money proponents. Again, rather than asking where or how banks obtain reserve balances once they have extended credit, the more fundamental issue is to consider when banks use reserve balances in the first place. Otherwise, as demonstrated, one might be assuming a constraint upon bank behavior where none in fact exists, even within the endogenous money paradigm. In short, a bank deficient in reserve requirements or needing to settle an overdraft in its central bank account will seek to obtain reserve balances at the lowest possible cost, or it will obtain the reserve balances at a penalty from the central bank. As such, expanding its balance sheet (that is, creating additional outside money) creates a potential short position in reserve balances for the bank, which can affect the profitability of any loan it creates (at the initiation of a credit-worthy borrower), but does not affect the bank's ability to create the loan. As Shen (1997) puts it, a nation's payments system is a core part of the infrastructure of the modern business world. An earlier statement by the U. S.
Board of Governors concurs that "a reliable payments system is crucial to the economic growth and stability of the nation. The smooth functioning of markets for virtually every good and service is dependent upon the smooth functioning of banking and financial markets, which in turn is dependent upon the integrity of the nation's payments system" (Board of Governors 1990, 2). Table 1 presents payments data for several countries published by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems at the Bank for International Settlements. As reported in column 8, in the U. S., payments settled using balances held in Fed accounts amounted to almost $2.1 trillion per business day in 2005, which-as shown in column 11-is nearly 17 percent of annual GDP. In other words, within about six business days, the total dollar volume of payments settled using balances held in Fed accounts is comparable to annual GDP. Daily payment settlement using central bank balances is similar in size relative to GDP in other countries-about 17 percent in the Great Britain, Japan, and Sweden, and over 20 percent in Switzerland and the Euro countries.
Daily payment settlement using balances held in accounts at the Bank of Canada at nearly 11 percent of GDP is still very large even as it is the one of the lowest reported in the table. Consider further that a large percentage of these payments provide final settlement for still more payments previously cleared via netting arrangements on private payments systems (such as the Clearing House and Interbank Payments System (CHIPS) or the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC) in the U. S.).
The significance of such large quantities of payments requiring settlement on the central bank's books for central bankers is that central banks are the monopoly suppliers of net reserve balances to the banking system. This is obvious when considering the typical central bank balance sheet, which it is now commonplace to refer to when discussing central bank operations (see, for instance, Bell (2000) , Fullwiler (2003) , Hamilton (1997) , Lavoie (2001 Lavoie ( , 2003 , Lavoie and Rodriguez (2006) , Mosler (1997-8) , and Wray (1998 Wray ( , 2003 . Bindseil (2004) even dedicates an entire chapter to central bank balance sheets. As Lavoie (2001) and Lavoie and Rodriguez (2006) suggest, in general a central bank balance sheet will look something like the balance sheet shown in Table 2 . While there are substantial variations across central banks in terms of the relative sizes of different components on the balance sheet and also less significant variations in terms of how certain parts of the balance sheets are defined, the basic balance sheet in Table 2 is a core characteristic of modern central banking.
Due to double-entry accounting, banks in the aggregate cannot alter the total quantity of reserve balances in circulation. Instead, the aggregate quantity of reserve balances changes only when there is a change in the central bank's balance sheet as a result of changes in claim on domestic banks, open market operations (to alter claims on governments or the outstanding quantity of central bank bills), or changes to other parts of its balance sheet (such as the government's account or foreign reserves). That is, while an individual bank can lend balances it deems are in excess of its desired holdings, in the aggregate such lending by banks simply shifts balances from bank to bank, but does nothing to alter the aggregate quantity.
Similarly, an individual bank desiring more reserve balances can borrow in the interbank or other money markets, while such borrowing between banks again can only shift balances between banks and does not alter the aggregate quantity.
Due to both the large quantity of payments settled on the central bank's books and the fact that only changes to the central bank's balance sheet can affect the aggregate quantity of balances for settling these payments, it is increasingly recognized, as a previous report by the U. S. Government Accountability Office put it, that "the primary objective of all central banks is to ensure the smooth functioning of their countries payments systems" (Government Accountability Office 2002, 2). Richmond Fed President Lacker has suggested that interbank deposit services are the "core" of central banking (2006, 3) . As mentioned in Principle 1, central banks provide intraday or at least overnight credit (and usually both) to banks at some price. Indeed, a survey of national payments systems around the world, Emmons (1997) finds that central banks do this via direct overdrafts, collateralized overdrafts, intraday repurchase agreements, or, at the very least, overnight lending. As column 3 of Table 1 shows, all of the central banks listed in Table 2 provide intraday credit; Canada, for which column 3 shows intraday credit of 0, actually utilizes a system in which banks pledge collateral at the start of business to cover negative intraday balances (Bank of International Settlements 2007, 21n) . Furfine (2000, 539) notes that in the U. S. it is not uncommon for banks active in the payments system to send and receive payments whose value are around 200 times their average overnight balances. To enable this, as columns 3 and 4 respectively show, the Fed has about $36 billion in intraday overdrafts to banks outstanding on average throughout the business day while the peak amount of intraday credit averages about $116 billion. Regarding overnight credit, Column 5 shows that the U. S., U. K., Switzerland, Sweden, and the EMU all provide overnight credit, while several countries also provide "term loans" or-in other words-loans to the private sector via repurchase agreements, many of which are also overnight. Canada is the one country listed as providing neither overnight credit nor loans via repurchase agreements; however, Canada's system is such that all banks are effectively guaranteed the opportunity to clear net positive or negative balances in central bank accounts prior to the close of business (this is discussed in more detail in Principle 8; see also Lavoie (2005) and Rochon and Rossi (2007) ).
Whereas large central bank operations to support the financial system are usually considered a "last resort," less often recognized is the fact that central banks are actually carrying out operations (via some combination of overdrafts, lending, or term loans) of substantial size on a daily basis. Further, while some recently have questioned the ability or willingness of central banks to carry out frequent and large-scale operations to support interest rate targets (e.g., Friedman 2000, 271) , it is again clear that central banks already do this as needed on a typical business day to support normal payments system functioning. It is also worth mentioning that central banks face no operational constraint in carrying out such large operationsas they simply involve debiting or crediting balances on the central bank's own balance sheet-even as there might be legal or political constraints to doing so imposed by national governments. Regarding the reserve balance portion of the monetary base, consider a central bank that attempts to supply aggregate balances in quantities that differ significantly from banks' needs to settle payments or to meet reserve requirements.
This would be a highly questionable operating tactic, to say the least. As noted in Principle 2, central banks are monopoly suppliers of reserve balances and thus are obligated to ensure the smooth functioning of national payments systems; they thereby provide intraday or overnight credit at some price. Similarly, it would "seem inappropriate or even legally questionable that the central bank should use its power to squeeze the market in a way that makes it impossible for banks to comply with [reserve] requirements" (Bindseil 2004, p. 236) . In practice, and as previously mentioned, individual banks deficient in meeting reserve requirements automatically receive a central bank loan at a pre-specified penalty rate, much like central bank overdraft policies associated with payment settlement.
As the demand for reserve balances is very interest inelastic on a daily basis (where payment needs dominate the demand for reserve balances) or at least by the end of the maintenance period (where reserve requirements dominate), supplying more or fewer reserve balances than banks in the aggregate desire to hold will simply result in the interbank rate falling to the rate banks earn on balances in reserve accounts (if too many balances are supplied) or rising to the penalty rate assessed on overdrafts from the central bank (if too few are otherwise supplied). As such, a reserve balance "target" would be actually a de facto interest rate target at either the rate paid on balances in reserve accounts or the central bank's penalty rate.
In practice, a reserve balance operating target would more likely send the interbank rate fluctuating between these two rates, as banks' demand for reserve balances can shift significantly from day-to-day (depending upon the particulars of the national payments system and the reserve requirement regime) and even within a given day. Significant volatility in the overnight rate is not desirable, however. As a member of the Fed's Board of Governors explained, A significant increase in volatility in the federal funds rate would be of concern because it would affect other overnight rates, raising funding risks for most large banks, securities dealers, and other money market participants. Suppliers of funds to the overnight markets, including many small banks and thrifts, would face greater uncertainty about the returns they would earn and market participants would incur additional costs in managing their funding to limit their exposure to the heightened risk. (Meyer 2000, 4) .
Even within neoclassical economic theory, such volatility in the overnight rate would become problematic from a monetary policy perspective "if [it were] transmitted to maturities which are deemed directly relevant for decisions of economic agents (Bindseil 2004, 100-101) . As a result, even when the Fed's stated strategy during 1979-1982 was to target a reserve aggregate such as non-borrowed reserves, in order to keep volatility in the federal funds rate from becoming excessive-which was highly likely given that reserve balances earned no interest while there were also significant "frown costs" historically associated with borrowing from the Fed-the actual tactic employed ensured that the federal funds rate remained within an acceptable range, as confirmed in Meulendyke (1988) . Thus, Moore (1988) Since a central bank's operating target is necessarily an interest rate, its general approach to daily operations is to accommodate banks' demand for reserve balances at that rate. The process of accommodating the demand for reserve balances varies for different central banks depending upon particulars of the payments system and how/if there are reserve requirements (discussed a bit more in Principle 6). As discussed in Principle 2, all central banks face an intraday demand for reserve balances that is accommodated at some price either through intraday or overnight credit. If there are reserve requirements, then the central bank also accommodates a demand to hold reserve balances overnight at least by the end of the maintenance period. Even without reserve requirements, there may be reasons for banks to desire to hold reserve balances overnight as a buffer against the uncertainty of overnight overdrafts (discussed in Principle 8 below). In each case, the demand for reserve balances will be subject to shifts-rising during peak settlement times during the day, during high payment flow days (often related to calendar effects), and/or during the end of the maintenance period. Because the current state of central banking practice is such that the target rate is set above the rate paid on reserve balances and below the penalty rate on central bank loans (discussed in Principle 9 below), the central bank must accommodate these shifts in real time if it is to achieve the target rate on a consistent basis. Again, to "under" or "over" accommodate would lead to the overnight rate rising to the penalty rate on borrowing from the central bank or falling to the rate paid on reserve balances, respectively.
As changes to the central bank's balance sheet are the only possible source of changes to the aggregate quantity of reserve balances, in the process of accommodating the demand for reserve balances, central banks offset changes in their own balance sheets that occur autonomously or outside the direct control of those in charge of central bank operations. In most cases, this refers to offsetting the reserve balance effects of additions to currency or changes in the government's account, but any of the changes to the central bank's balance sheet (such as that shown in Table 2 ) not consistent with accommodating the demand for reserve balances will be offset in practice.
In achieving Second, the central bank's ability to achieve its interest rate target would not be threatened-as several previously suggested-if the so-called "revolution" in electronic money ("e-money") at some point resulted in the complete elimination of currency in circulation. When the public demands more currency, it is supplied endogenously and reserve balances are drained in kind. If, for instance, the rise of e-money were to somehow result in the total elimination of the public's demand for currency, the central bank's operations would actually be simplified, as a major source of changes to the central bank's balance sheet that daily operations must offset would be eliminated.
Third, central banks necessarily sterilize currency operations that move the quantity of reserve balances away from that desired by the banking system at the target rate. Much like attempting to target reserve balances at a level below or above that desired by banks at the target interest rate, unsterilized interventions that alter central bank foreign exchange reserves (part of central bank assets in Table 2 ) would raise the rate to the central bank's penalty rate or lower it to the rate paid on reserve balances (Wray 1998 However, the demand for reserve balances is extremely interest inelastic at the quantity of balances banks desire to settle payments for the day. If there are too many or too few balances relative to banks' demand, the interbank rate will respectively fall to the rate paid by the central bank on balances or rise to the central bank's penalty rate. Further, as in Principle 2, there is the possibility of substantial instability in the payments system if insufficient balances for settling the day's payments are not provided.
To lessen the difficulty of the central bank's task of achieving the targeted interest rate without excessive volatility, banks may be directed to hold additional reserve balances where reserve requirements are in effect, but loans still create deposits and reserve balances still do not "fund" the creation of bank liabilities.
Instead, reserve requirements will accomplish three things. First, significant reserve requirements raise the quantity of balances held and thereby reduce the likelihood that banks will end the day in overdraft, thereby reducing the likelihood of instability in the payments system and undesirable increases in the interbank rate as banks attempt to avoid overdraft charges. Second, given a multi-day maintenance period, they reduce the inelasticity of the demand for reserve balances on most days-aside from the end of the maintenance period-by permitting averaging of reserve balances held against reserve requirements across days; this reduces the potential effects on the target rate of incorrect forecasts of changes to the central bank's balance sheet. Third, they reduce the uncertainty on the parts of both banks and the central bank regarding the quantity of reserve balances demanded at the target rate on a given day whenever the maintenance period lags the end of the computation period. Fourth, given the reduced inelasticity of the demand for reserve balances, there may be a reduced need for operations by the central bank to sustain the target rate; for instance, both the Fed (2-week maintenance period) and the ECB (month-long maintenance period) carry out less It bears noting, however, there is at least a bit of a tradeoff in that reserve requirements can introduce some additional complexities for achieving and sustaining the target rate, as well. First, the less lagged the maintenance period is from the end of the computation period, the more uncertainty will exist for banks in determining reserve needs and therefore also for the central bank in correctly estimating the demand for reserve balances; as the point of reserve requirements is stabilization of short-term interest rates, the more "contemporaneous" the maintenance and computations periods are, the more counterproductive such a reserve requirement regime may be, ceteris paribus. Second, as Whitesell (2006) notes, without some sort of provision for carrying over deficiencies or surpluses from one maintenance period to the next, interbank rates on the last days of the maintenance period can be volatile as capacities for averaging balances held across days become exhausted. Third, it is difficult for the central bank to respond too precisely to previous, current, or expected temporary deviations from the target rate since it may be difficult or even impossible for the banking system to "work off" excess balances or "build up" from shortages by the end of the maintenance period.
Finally, banks will speculate on the near-term direction of the overnight rate and in the presence of averaging provisions these expectations can become self-fulfilling; this is because is often not be reasonable for the central bank to completely offset these actions as it would likely entail leaving the banking system with too large an excess or deficient position (e.g., Krieger 2002 , Whitesell 2003 . As Lavoie (2005) puts it, "averaging provisioning flattens the relevant segment of the demand curve for reserves, but it also tends to induce vertical shifts in the middle horizontal portion of the demand curve, due to changing expected overnight rates, which may differ from the target rate" (704-705). In the U. S. such "anticipation effects" are known to be related to target rate changes, historical patterns of rate deviations from the target within the maintenance period, high-payment flow days, and calendar-related events such as end-of-quarter "window dressing" of bank balance
sheets (Carpenter and Demiralp 2006, Krieger 2002 ). In the debates between horizontalists and structuralists, Pollin (1996) suggests that central banks-the Fed, in particular-do not have complete ability to achieve their target rates, and presents econometric evidence to support this argument. Given the large quantity of research on this point since, it is now clear that one needs to make a distinction between operating procedures in place for the purposes of achieving the target and the actual ability of the central bank to achieve the target with a minimum of volatility. While numerous central banks have utilized procedures that enable significant (or at least statistically significant) volatility, that a central bank could achieve its target rate as precisely as desired is now well established.
Though reserve requirements can improve the central bank's ability to hit the overnight rate target, they are merely one possible way of reducing variability in the overnight rate. In the U. S., after the rise of retail sweep account technology, banks became far more likely to incur overnight overdrafts as the quantity of reserve balances demanded became less tied to reserve requirements and more closely tied to the more variable, daily payment settlement needs of banks rather than the more predictable, bi-weekly demand for reserve requirements. Not surprisingly, federal funds rate volatility increased dramatically. However, the Overall, the quantity of reserve balances demanded by banks has nothing to do with a central bank's ability to achieve the interest rate target with minimal volatility. Though in the absence of reserve requirements the demand for reserve balances becomes much more interest inelastic, the corridor set by the central bank's penalty rate and the rate paid on reserve balances sets the limit for potential deviations from the target rate. That some central banks have left in place operating procedures that permit greater volatility is quite different from suggesting that they cannot do otherwise.
Principle 7: There is no "liquidity effect" associated with central bank changes to its operating target.
There is a vast literature on the term "liquidity effect," most recently focusing on identifying the effects on the interest rate-if any-at the daily frequency of "shocks" to the quantity of reserve balances. The use of the term here, however, refers to the use of open market operations when the central bank changes its target rate to more or less permanently alter the supply-demand balance of reserve balances (at least until the next target change occurs) in the overnight market in order to generate the desired change in the target rate. A liquidity effect as defined here is the procedure for changing the target rate generally assumed by most economists and textbooks. In fact, however, a good deal of recent empirical research has generally concluded that there is no such liquidity effect in practice (e.g., Thornton 2006 Thornton , 2007a Thornton , 2007b Demiralp and Jorda 2002) . The lack of evidence has led many to suggest there is instead an "announcement effect" at work when the central bank changes the target rate; that is, central banks simply announce a new target rate, rather than carrying out any actual operations to effect the change (e.g.,
Guthrie and Wright 2000, Demiralp and Jorda 2002).
An understanding of modern central bank operations outlined in the foregoing principles makes clear that there is no liquidity effect related to target rate changes. As Sandra Krieger (head of domestic reserve management and discount operations, New York Fed) put it,
The conventional textbook view is that the Trading Desk buys and sells securities in response to easings and tightenings [i.e., the liquidity effect]. From the [Trading] Desk's perspective, however, the supply-demand balance is primarily a function of the demand for required balances, which is almost completely insensitive to small changes in policy. Consequently, any change in the target has no effect on excess supply or demand in the funds market. (Krieger 2002, 74) Since there is no change in the supply-demand balance for reserve balances with a target rate change, there is no need for open market operations related to a liquidity effect as defined here. In the case of the Fed, while it might temporarily change the quantity of balances in order to "signal" a new rate to traders or to "nudge" the rate when traders do not move to the new target quickly enough, any changes inconsistent with the given demand for reserve balances-unlike a liquidity effectare necessarily reversed later in the maintenance period (Krieger 2002, 74) . This in fact was the Fed's operational procedure prior to 1994-after which it began publicly announcing its target changes-which likely accounts for the empirical evidence some have uncovered of open market operations correlated with target changes in this earlier period; note, however, consistent with "signals" or "nudges," none have found empirical evidence of a change in the supply-demand balance in the federal funds market related to a target change either before or since 1994.
The mistaken belief that the central bank alters the quantity of balances in circulation in order to change the target rate erroneously implies that banks can "do" something with additional reserve balances when they are supplied, as with the money multiplier model. Again, however, from Principle 1, loans create deposits, and thus reserve balances do not provide additional "funding" for expanding the quantity of bank liabilities. As with previous principles, permanently changing the quantity of reserve balances in circulation would simply send the overnight rate to the central bank's penalty rate or the rate paid on reserve balances if the change in quantity supplied were inconsistent with the quantity banks desired to settle payments and meet reserve requirements. Also, while there is evidence of a negative historical correlation over several weeks between reserve balances held and interest rates associated with reserve requirements-even as the demand for reserve balances for the current maintenance period is very interest inelastic-the causation is well-known to run from changes in the interest rate to changes in the public's holding of interest bearing versus non-interest bearing assets, which, again, has nothing to do with a liquidity effect as defined here.
Of course, this point is all the more valid where the demand for reserve balances is due mostly or even purely to payment settlement, which, again, exhibits still greater interest inelasticity. In this case, there is clearly no point in attempting to add or subtract reserve balances to change an interest rate target, since banks only desire that quantity necessary to settle payments for the day. 
Principle 8: The quantity of reserve balances in circulation is primarily determined by the central bank's method of interest rate maintenance.
There are a number of reasons why researchers have concerned themselves with the quantity of reserve balances circulating. Of course, the money-multiplier view posits that changes to reserve balances lead directly to changes in the money aggregates; it is noteworthy that the St. Louis Fed continues to publish measures of the monetary base "adjusted" for changes in reserve requirements Rasche 1996, Anderson et al. 2003 ) consistent with its adherence to the money multiplier view. Others have been concerned that falling quantities of reserve balances demanded-due to retail sweep accounts reducing reserve requirements or the e-money revolution enabling banks to substitute private means of settlement in place of central bank balances-could impede central banks' abilities to target interest rates. However, recall again-from Principles 1 and 2-that the quantity of reserve balances banks desire to hold is set by the need to settle payments and (where applicable) meet reserve requirements, and that-from Principles 3 and 4-the central bank's operations are defensive in nature, accommodating the demand for reserve balances at the target rate while offsetting changes to the central bank's balance sheet (also note from Principle 7 the quantity banks desire to hold is unchanged when the central bank changes its target rate).
Instead of being related to a desire to enable more (or less) lending or being an indicator of a central bank's ability to set an interest rate target, this principle demonstrates that the quantity of reserve balances circulating is mostly set by the central bank's method of interest rate targeting. More specifically, the primary factors determining how many reserve balances banks desire to hold at the target rate (and which the central bank will accommodate) are the existence and size of reserve requirements, the certainty banks have regarding their abilities to avoid ending the day with an overdraft or otherwise avoid holding more/fewer balances than desired, and whether the interest rate target is set at or above the interest rate paid on reserve balances. These characteristics are set either by the central bank itself or by the political/regulatory context within which the central bank operates.
To begin, interest rate targeting in the presence of reserve requirements obviously results in more reserve balances circulating, and depending upon the size of reserve requirements, the quantity might be much larger. Whether reserve requirements can be met by bank vault cash held (as in the U. S.) or not (as in the European Monetary Union) will also clearly affect the quantity of balances banks desire to hold and the central bank accommodates.
Absent reserve requirements, banks would desire to hold only an amount of excess balances related to the uncertainty surrounding needs to settle payments by the end of the business day. Bindseil (2004, 79) writes that Orr and Mellon (1961) were the first to suggest that a demand for excess reserves exists only when banks However, a target rate set equal to the rate paid on reserve balances-as proposed in Principle 6-in fact would enable exogenous control over the quantity of reserve balances circulating, provided that the quantity circulating was at least sufficient for banks to meet payment settlement needs and reserve requirements; as noted in Principle 6, the primary benefit to central bankers of this tactic is a substantial simplification of operations since they would no longer need to precisely estimate reserve demand in order to drain undesired balances and could achieve the target rate simply by providing an oversupply of balances to banks. Note, however, that the result of significantly raising the quantity of excess reserve balances circulating under such an operating procedure would be greater control over the interest rate target; it would have nothing to do with an increased ability of banks to create outside money (since loans still create deposits, and the quantity of loans created would still be necessarily demand-determined).
One can thus conceive of a wide spectrum of possible methods of interest rate targeting that would result in substantial differences in the quantity of reserve balances circulating. At one extreme there are central banks like the Bank of Canada, whose interest rate targeting environment includes no reserve requirements, considerable precision in offsetting the central bank's balance sheet, no uncertainty on the part of banks regarding overnight overdrafts, and the interest rate target is set above the rate paid on reserve balances; total reserve balances held overnight are essentially zero under these circumstances. At the other extreme would be the Bank of Japan during the period of zero interest rate targeting and socalled "quantitative easing." In that case, since the interest rate target and the rate paid on reserve balances were both zero, a very large quantity of undesired excess balances could be allowed to circulate while still being consistent with achieving the target rate. The current U.S. method of interest-rate maintenance sits between these two extremes. With the federal funds rate target above the rate paid on reserve balances (zero percent), all undesired excess balances are drained; thus a given deficit requires bond sales for interest rate support. Reserve requirements and uncertainty related to end-of-day overdrafts in payment settlement, on the other hand, raise the quantity of reserve balances banks desire to hold. In the ECB, since reserve requirements cannot be met through vault cash, reserve balances desired are more than in the U. S.; but balances held by Japanese banks during the zero rate targeting period could be substantially larger than those held by EMU banks since in the later case the target rate is set above the rate paid on balances.
In short, then, the quantity of reserve balances circulating primarily has to do with how the central bank achieves and maintains its target rate. It is unrelated to traditional notions of "tight" or "easy" monetary policy as the money-multiplier model assumes.
Principle 9: Under current operating procedures, the central bank's balance sheet expands and contracts endogenously while these changes neither create nor destroy net financial assets for the non-government sector.
Central to the monetarist view is that "money does not burn holes in pockets" (Yeager 1968 ); thus, even as real-world central banks do not actually drop money from helicopters, since central bank operations are presumed to have the power to generate excess liquidity (in the form of reserve balances and/or the monetary base) and wealth effects, in the monetarist and neoclassical paradigms, they might as well be dropping money from helicopters. This principle demonstrates to the contrary that central bank operations do not affect "excess liquidity" or net financial wealth in the non-government sector (except for a special case described below, which in fact has more to do with fiscal policy).
As in Principles 3 and 8, neither reserve balances nor the monetary base can be expanded or contracted exogenously by the central bank as long as the central bank's target rate is above the rate paid on reserve balances. Under these conditions, from Principle 2, the central bank necessarily accommodates the demand for reserve balances related to payment settlement; from Principles 3 and 5, the central bank necessarily accommodates the demand for reserve balances to meet reserve requirements; from Principle 4, the central bank necessarily offsets changes to its own balance sheet that are not consistent with accommodating the demand for reserve balances at the target rate. It is noteworthy that a recent restatement of monetarism by Nelson and Schwartz (2008, 32) argues that a central bank "is always able to expand its total balance sheet at a sufficient rate so that bulges in currency demand do not translate into drains on bank reserves"; the point here, though, is that a central bank can do no other-if the quantity of balances circulating is less than that desired by banks, the central bank's balance sheet will
expand either via open market operations or as banks incur overdrafts in payment settlement or in meeting reserve requirements. Also not clear from Nelson and Schwartz's statement is whether they understand that with the target rate set above the rate paid on reserve balances the central bank cannot expand its balance sheet exogenously in a manner that would be inconsistent with banks' demand for reserve balances at the target rate. Bindseil (2004, 156) notes, repurchase agreements-since they are simply collateralized loans-are functionally equivalent to overdrafts. In the case of the Fed (and for many other central banks, as well), the quantity of outstanding repurchase agreements for decades has been larger than the quantity of reserve balances circulating. Since under current operating tactics central bank operations are consistent with Lavoie's description of an overdraft system, logically it cannot be the case that the central bank is creating "excess liquidity" since loans or overdrafts are created at the initiation of the borrower, not the lender.
As in Principle 8, if the target rate is set equal to the rate paid on reserve balances, in this case the central bank can increase or decrease its balance sheet in an exogenous manner, provided that enough reserve balances are supplied to satisfy bank demand for them at the target rate. Recognition of this fact appears to be behind the Fed's recent request that Congress enable it to pay interest earlier than the 2011 date set in previous legislation (Ip 2008) , since this permission could enable the Fed to engage in TAF lending and some of the other "non-traditional" operations without necessitating offsetting drains via security sales or reverse repurchase agreements. Consistent with Principles 6 and 8, if the interest rate is set equal to the target rate, then monetary operations can be more consistent with an assetbased approach that oversupplies the system with reserve balances. However, even in that case the concept of "excess liquidity" would remain meaningless in the sense that market rates would still be anchored to the target rate-discussed below in In his critique of the horizontalists, Pollin (1996) relative to dollar value of trades overall in these other markets. He concluded in a second paper that it was markets that "go along" with the central bank's target given its "credible threat" to engage in larger operations, and that if the central bank's "willingness" to engage in such operations were ever doubted "in time, the market would cease to do the central bank's work for it," leading to a "decoupling" of the market interest rates from the central bank's target rate (Friedman 2000, 271) . Thornton (2006, 24) agreed that "as long as market participants believe the Fed can control the federal funds rate through open market operations, such operations are unnecessary."
Thornton's empirical research was cited in Principle 7 since he finds no evidence of a statistically significant liquidity effect at the daily frequency associated with the Fed's open market operations; however, this leads him, like Friedman, to argue that the Fed is not actually exhibiting exogenous control over short-term interest rates, but rather that target changes are endogenously made in response to changes in the "equilibrium" short-term market rate (Thornton 2006 (Thornton , 2007a (Thornton , 2007b .
In other words, he argues, as did Pollin, that there is a market "equilibrium" shortterm interest rate set by money markets independent of the central bank's target;
again, like Friedman, to the conclusion that "it would take very large open market operations to defend a target rate that differed significantly from the equilibrium rate should market participants come to doubt the Fed's ability to defend its rate objective" (Thornton 2006, 24 ).
Thornton's analysis, however, does not demonstrate that the central bank would need large operations to set and sustain (or "defend," as he puts it) its interest rate target. While there is agreement here with Thornton that there is in fact no liquidity effect to find (as in Principle 7), Thornton's study deliberately abstracts from high payment flow days and the few days that there were significant "outlier"
shocks to the Fed's balance sheet that unexpectedly affected the aggregate quantity of reserve balances. Thus, what his analysis actually demonstrates is the already well-documented ability of banks to substitute balances across days within the maintenance period to meet reserve requirements; for this reason, his finding that shocks to the Fed's balance sheet do not have a statistically significant correlation with daily movements in the federal funds rate is quite expected. Consider once again the case of Canada, with no reserve requirements: since there are zero reserve balances circulating overnight in Canada, there obviously would be no econometric evidence of a daily liquidity effect to uncover; though just as selfevidently the Bank of Canada does set and sustain its own target rate. From Principle 6, a central bank can set its own target rate as precisely as it desires; this is most easily done by narrowing the range between the rate paid on reserve balances and the penalty charged on borrowing from the central bank.
More importantly, Thornton, Friedman, and others making similar arguments neglect the fundamental fact that banks need reserve balances to settle payments each day and (where applicable) to meet reserve requirements; that is, there is no other financial asset that can substitute for central bank balances in these cases, and thus the central bank's target rate influences other short-term rates, not vice versa. In other words, because banks need reserve balances, the central bank's target rate "matters" and serves as an "anchor" in the determination of other short-term rates via arbitrage even as the central bank makes no attempt to directly affect these other rates (Fullwiler 2006, Rochon and Rossi 2007) . For the U.
S., this is confirmed empirically in numerous studies, most recently by Bartolini et al. (2005) , Cyree et al. (2003) , Demiralp et al. (2004) , Griffiths and Winters (1997) ,
and Lee (2003) , all of which find evidence of day-of-maintenance period and highpayment-flow day effects in overnight Eurodollar and/or repurchase agreement markets that mimic well-documented and well-understood patterns of the federal funds rate. Research shows that arbitrage between these markets is very active to the point that differences in default risk, collateral, and availability of offshore facilities come into play. Atesoglu's econometric studies similarly find one-way causation between the federal funds rate target and both the prime rate (Atesoglu 2003-4) and the long-term Treasury rate (Atesoglu 2005) . In short, there is no "equilibrium" short-term rate besides the rate targeted by the central bank; instead, as in Principle 7 there is no debate regarding its ability to achieve its target, while it is the central bank's target that serves as the anchor for these other rates.
Fullwiler (2006) Table 1 , so the suggestion that central bank operations are small is in fact at least somewhat misplaced to begin.
Most fundamentally, the quantity of reserve balances banks desire to hold over any time period, whether the quantity is zero or a very large sum, is immaterial to the central bank's ability to achieve its own target (from Principle 6) or for its target to serve as an anchor for other market rates as long as banks' demand for reserve balances remains non-trivial in the sense that arbitrage occurs between it and other short-term rates. Recall from Principle 5 that reserve requirements are a tool for aiding interest rate targeting and from Principle 6 that reserve requirements are simply one way of enabling interest rate targeting, while several central banks have found success with other methods; consequently, as Fullwiler (2003, 853) explains, "the payments system, rather than [the traditional focus on] reserve requirements, is the proper starting point for analysis" of central bank operations, which is consistent with above discussion in Principle 2. Rochon and Rossi (2004) also make much the same point. on the interbank market to be paid finally" (3; emphasis added). Sardoni (2006) concurs that the central bank's interest rate target "rules the roost" because its liabilities are the economy's unit of account or standard of value-the central bank's importance is the "outcome of complex historical, social, and economic processes"
and its "demise cannot be simply the result of spontaneous processes triggered by innovation" (5). Horizontalists also emphasized the inherent safety and default-risk free nature of settlement using central bank balances (Sardoni 2006 , Rochon and Rossi 2004 -"banks will prefer using central bank money to settle their Interbank debt because this alone ensures that any instability in the payments system is contained" (Rochon and Rossi 2007, 3) .
From the chartalist perspective (e.g., Wray 1998, Mosler and Forstater 1999) ,
by not considering payments to/from the state as fundamental to the demand for reserve balances, these authors have simply demonstrated that central bank liabilities sit at the top of the hierarchy of money (with which chartalists agree), not why this is so. According to chartalists, such analyses suffer from the logical fallacy of "infinite regress" since "what is missing is the process by which the unit of account is endowed with value" in the first place such that it would be used to settle payments (Mosler and Forstater 1999, 167) . The response of Fullwiler (2006) to the concerns raised regarding e-money is that only reserve balances can settle the tax liabilities of banks and their customers, which is alone sufficient for a non-trivial demand for reserve balances to exist. Note that the chartalist response here does not rely on the state's monopoly over the means of payment settlement; private means of final settlement have always existed and will continue to exist indefinitely, but the state's money and its interest rate target will still "matter" since reserve balances settle tax liabilities. It is important to reiterate for the purposes here, however, that both horizontalists and chartalists agree with the overarching principle that the central bank's interest rate target "matters" in the determination of other financial asset prices as long as there is a "non-trivial" demand for the central bank's liabilities for settling payments. Further, both agree that such a demand is a given in a modern capitalist system-though for different reasons-and thereby disagree with those who raise concerns regarding the rise of e-money or any other possible innovations that might one day emerge for the future ability of central banks to set an interest rate target that "matters."
Lastly, it is worth adding that debate will surely continue among Post
Keynesians regarding the implications of exchange rate policy for the central bank's ability to exercise discretion in setting its interest rate target and the ability of this target to anchor (instead of being anchored by) other financial market prices. For instance, some (primarily, though not exclusively, chartalists) argue the points made in this principle presume flexible exchange rates, which they argue is a precondition for creating the policy space necessary to set an interest rate target independently of "market forces" except in those cases when the nation accumulates a substantial reserve of foreign currency (e.g., Kam and Smithin 2004, Sardoni and Wray 2007; Wray 2006) . Others (primarily horizontalists, but, again, not exclusively) advocate fixed (albeit potentially adjustable) exchange rates to reduce international financial instability but also affirm the points made in this principle regarding the central bank's ability to exogenously set a target rate and for this target to "anchor" other market rates. Still others argue that there is no such thing as truly flexible exchange rates that provide true discretion over interest rates independent of "market forces." For instance, Nevile and Kreisler (2006) probably summarize the views of many when they argue that "policy makers in even moderately open economies cannot ignore the effects of their actions on the exchange rate" given the extraordinary mobility of international capital.
Concluding Remarks
While operations of individual central banks differ, there are several "general principles" that apply. Given that there is a growing neoclassical empirical literature on central bank operations to go with decades of Post Keynesian research on central bank operations, modern monetary economists should be expected to understand many of these principles; in other words, for an economist in either camp to suggest for instance that reserve balances are a discretionary variable (with the target rate set above the rate paid on reserve balances), that the central bank cannot reliably achieve its target rate, or that central bank operations have any similarities with the money multiplier model, all would demonstrate a lack of familiarity with volumes of published research. In this regard, Bindseil (2004) could be required reading for current monetary economists of all persuasions, though it is disappointing that well-known Post Keynesian literature is not cited aside from fairly cursory mention of Moore (1988) ; indeed, Bindseil's book would be all the more groundbreaking were it not for the fact that the general arguments therein to a large degree have been made previously by horizontalists, circuitistes, or chartalists.
Looking forward, a comprehension of the general principles of central bank operations is a necessary stepping stone for understanding current issues in macroeconomic policy such as fiscal deficits, saving and capital investment, and public pension reform; it is further a necessary precondition for relating the complexities of the modern global macroeconomic environment-which is increasingly more complex given continuous innovation in derivatives, international finance, securitization, and structured finance-into the development of proposals for financial and macroeconomic stability within such an environment. 
